Dragging Out Protesters Disrupting City Council Meeting Isn’t Excessive Force

From Judge Danielle Forrest’s opinion in Williamson v. City of National City, joined by Judges Susan Graber and Consuelo Callahan, which strikes me as correct:

This excessive force case concerns how police officers responded to a protest that Plaintiff Tasha Williamson and others participated in during a National City, California, city council meeting. The protest prevented the city council meeting from continuing, and police officers warned the protesters that they had to leave the meeting room or they would be arrested.

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Dragging Out Protesters Disrupting City Council Meeting Isn’t Excessive Force

From Judge Danielle Forrest’s opinion in Williamson v. City of National City, joined by Judges Susan Graber and Consuelo Callahan, which strikes me as correct:

This excessive force case concerns how police officers responded to a protest that Plaintiff Tasha Williamson and others participated in during a National City, California, city council meeting. The protest prevented the city council meeting from continuing, and police officers warned the protesters that they had to leave the meeting room or they would be arrested.

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The Right to Defy Criminal Demands: Possible Limits on the Right to Defy (Part II)

I’ve just finished up a rough draft of my The Right to Defy Criminal Demands article, and I thought I’d serialize it here, minus most of the footnotes (which you can see in the full PDF). I’d love to hear people’s reactions and recommendations, since there’s still plenty of time to edit it. You can also see previous posts (and any future posts, as they come up), here.
[* * *]
I’ve shown in earlier posts, I think, that the law at least sometimes expressly or implicitly recognizes a right to defy. But not always, and not everywhere.

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The Right to Defy Criminal Demands: Possible Limits on the Right to Defy (Part II)

I’ve just finished up a rough draft of my The Right to Defy Criminal Demands article, and I thought I’d serialize it here, minus most of the footnotes (which you can see in the full PDF). I’d love to hear people’s reactions and recommendations, since there’s still plenty of time to edit it. You can also see previous posts (and any future posts, as they come up), here.
[* * *]
I’ve shown in earlier posts, I think, that the law at least sometimes expressly or implicitly recognizes a right to defy. But not always, and not everywhere.

Read original

The Right to Defy Criminal Demands: Possible Limits on the Right to Defy (Part II)

I’ve just finished up a rough draft of my The Right to Defy Criminal Demands article, and I thought I’d serialize it here, minus most of the footnotes (which you can see in the full PDF). I’d love to hear people’s reactions and recommendations, since there’s still plenty of time to edit it. You can also see previous posts (and any future posts, as they come up), here.
[* * *]
I’ve shown in earlier posts, I think, that the law at least sometimes expressly or implicitly recognizes a right to defy. But not always, and not everywhere.

Read original

The Right to Defy Criminal Demands: Possible Limits on the Right to Defy (Part II)

I’ve just finished up a rough draft of my The Right to Defy Criminal Demands article, and I thought I’d serialize it here, minus most of the footnotes (which you can see in the full PDF). I’d love to hear people’s reactions and recommendations, since there’s still plenty of time to edit it. You can also see previous posts (and any future posts, as they come up), here.
[* * *]
I’ve shown in earlier posts, I think, that the law at least sometimes expressly or implicitly recognizes a right to defy. But not always, and not everywhere.

Read original

Armed Police Visit to Grandmother, Aimed at Getting Granddaughter to Stop Trying to File Rape Charges, May Be a First Amendment Violation

From Borkowski v. Baltimore County, decided yesterday by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow (D. Md.):

This case began as a putative class action revolving around the investigation and handling of sexual assault allegations by various Baltimore County and University of Maryland affiliated entities and individuals. After two motions to dismiss, the sole remaining claim is one for First Amendment retaliation brought by Plaintiff Anna Borkowski against the remaining Defendants.
Ms.

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Who Bears the Burden of Proof in Self-Defense Cases?

Self-defense is an affirmative defense, so the defendant has the burden of producing evidence: He must put on some evidence from which a jury can find self-defense. But then the burden of proof returns to the prosecution, which must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
It was not always thus. The English common law rule at the time of the Framing was that the defendant must prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and the Supreme Court has held (Martin v. Ohio (1987)) that placing this burden on the accused would be constitutional.

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Who Bears the Burden of Proof in Self-Defense Cases?

Self-defense is an affirmative defense, so the defendant has the burden of producing evidence: He must put on some evidence from which a jury can find self-defense. But then the burden of proof returns to the prosecution, which must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
It was not always thus. The English common law rule at the time of the Framing was that the defendant must prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and the Supreme Court has held (Martin v. Ohio (1987)) that placing this burden on the accused would be constitutional.

Read original

Who Bears the Burden of Proof in Self-Defense Cases?

Self-defense is an affirmative defense, so the defendant has the burden of producing evidence: He must put on some evidence from which a jury can find self-defense. But then the burden of proof returns to the prosecution, which must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
It was not always thus. The English common law rule at the time of the Framing was that the defendant must prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, and the Supreme Court has held (Martin v. Ohio (1987)) that placing this burden on the accused would be constitutional.

Read original